Investigation into logger’s

death calls for formal
training in fire-fighting

Ernie Kingston's death was preventable and IWA
CANADA supports changes in the way workers are used
to fight fires in British Columbia.

logger Ernie Kingston in a fire-

fighting accident, recommen-
dations from a BC. Coroner investi-
gating the case have yet to be put into
place.

On August 1, 1991, the 30 year old
lost his life while fighting fire on
behalf of Weldwood Canada Ltd. in
Clowhom Falls Logging Division in
Narrows Inlet. Since that time repre-
sentatives from IWA-CANADA Local
1-71 have been trying to get the pow-
ers that be to make some changes so
that such a needless death will never
Wega again.

uring a hot summer day, a fireina
yarding setting, likely caused by
faulty bearings in a haulback block,
got out of control and set ablaze a
setting of previously felled timber.
timber.

On the site were an official of the
BC. Forest Service, a supervisor from
Weldwood Canada, and loggers who
were fighting the fire as required under
pean provisions of the B.C. Forest

ct.

As the fire ignited in the morning,
the company supervisor was in charge
while the Forest Officer overlooked
the fire fighting efforts from a helicop-
ter. iventcall the Forest Service
called in water bomber aircraft to
douse the fire with fire retardant.

After the fire retardant was applied
a logging crew of 6 men including
Ernie Kingston believed that they
had clearance to take a fire hose down
a hill with a 50 - 75% grade to spread
water on some felled and bucked tim-
ber which was laying over and around
a draw.

While the crew was over the bank
to hose down the timber which had
not yet been yarded in, a sudden fire
erupted and spread uphill towards
the workers.

Five of the six crew workers scram-
bled up the bank to a logging road,
while Ernie Kingston, the lead man
down the hill with the fire hose could
not make it back in time.

He was overcome by the intense
heat of the flames and fell only 15 feet
from the road. Then the fire burnt out
of control and wasn’t contained until
the next day.

The tragedy was hard to take for
Brother Kingston’s fellow workers and
employers. A terrible accident had
taken place for reasons that appear
preventable.

In a judgment of inquiry by the
BC. Coroner's service, Coroner Dan
Devlin heard evidence of the tragic
events and gave 10 solid recommen-
dations to prevent such tragedies in
the future (see accompaning article).

During the course of his investiga-
tion, Mr. Devlin could not establish

EARLY eight months after
the unnecessary death of B.C.

6/LUMBERWORKER/APRIL, 1992

who was in charge of the work force at
the most crucial period before the
tragic accident took place.

The Coroners report stated: “The
matter of who was in charge is a key
point but it is not possible to further
clarify this point with any certainty.”

Under provisions of the B.C. Forest
Act, the licensee in this case Weld-
wood, is required to fight fires which
start on its claim.

In fact that’s what happened. Once
the fire broke out in the morning,
company personnel fought the fire
until water bombers came in around
noon hour to spread the fire retard-
ants.

Some crucial evidence was given
before the Coroner. Ernié Kingston,
like many other Weldwood employees,
had a limited capacity in previous fire
fighting. And, like many other BC.
loggers who risk their lives, Kingston
received no formal training fighting

res.

The vast majority of
loggers receive
absolutely no training
in fire-fighting

Murray Cantelon, IWA-CANADA’s
Local 1-71’s Business Agent for the
Weldwood operation says that fire
fighting efforts involving workers are
often erratic at best. While fire-
fighters who work with the BC. For-
est Service receive extensive training
and physical conditioning courses, the
vast majority of loggers receive abso-
lutely no training at all.

Brother Cantelon sees this as a
clear double standard. Loggers are
not given training, even though they
are very likely to come in contact with
a fire fighting situation during their
work life.

Workers are also unfamiliar with
the properties and capabilities of fire
retardants. In the accident at Weld-
wood the workers had a false sense of
security that the fire retardant
dropped by water bombers had the
fire under control. But although the
fire seemed to be controlled on the
surface, it was quite hot underneath.

The logs in the draw which flamed
up and trapped Brother Kingston,
were a tinder box mixture of cedar,
hemlock, balsam (felled for approxi-
mately 1 year) which exploded into
flames.

Photo courtesy Local 1-71

Coroner's recommendations —
‘common sense and realistic’

Asa result of the investigation into
the accidental death of Ernie Kings-
ton, ten solid recommendations were
made by Coroner Dan Devlin. In turn
he has sent the recommendations to
the B.C. Forest Service, Weldwood of
Canada, the Council of Forest Indus-
tries, the Truck Loggers Associations,
Forest Industrial Relations, and the
Workers’ Compensation Board of Brit-
ish Columbia.

“We want to make sure that these
recommendations are implemented in
the right places,” says IWA-CANADA.
Local 1-71 Business Agent Murray
Cantelon. “We have to make sure the
recommendations aren’t just shoved
in some drawer and lost.”

Local 1-71 Safety Director Bob
Patterson has sent a copy of the fol-
lowing recommendations to all sub-
local committees so that workers in
those operations can also push for
changes.

One of Mr. Devlin’s recommenda-
tions is that a fire fighting policy be
included in the WCB Health and Safety
Regulations.

“Tt seems wrong that WCB inspec-
tors come into operations, check
things out and walk by the fire fight-
ing equipment because that’s not in
their jurisdiction,” says Brother
Cantelon.

He also stresses the recommenda-
tion and says that there should be a
clearly defined, legal chain of com-
mand when it comes to fighting fires.

The report said: “The matter of
who was in charge is a key point but is
not possible to further clarify with
any certainty.”

The coroners recommendations are
as follows:

1. The BC. Forest Service should

make it clear to companies that,

. When there is a fire, the BCFS

. The WCB should get together,

. All companies expected to fight

. All companies must ensure their

although a Forest Officer may be
present at a fire scene, responsi-
bility for fire fighting remains
with the company unless the For-
est Service takes over.

should make sure that the com-
pany has enough trained person-
nel and equipment to do an effec-
tive job. The BCFS should not
take it for granted.

with the BCFS and develop a fire
fighting policy which will be
included under WCB Health and
Safety Regulations, then the WCB
could police the regulations.

fires should have P lans clearly set
out, along with supervising
responsibilities to establish a
chain of command.

fire fighting equipment is main-
tained and kept in a state of
readiness. This could be done by
appointing one employee as a fire
warden who would be given
enough hours in his schedule to
carry out the fire fighting equip-
ment maintenance duties.

. Company supervisors must re-

ceive formal training in fire sup-
pression methods, organizations,
chain of command, communica-
tions and crew safety. Records of
the training should be available

for regulatory agencies.

. All workers who may be asked to

fight fires must first receive for-
mal training, and records of this
should be kept. Workers without
training should not be required to
fight fires. f

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