|

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

ned campaign to cheat ordinary people.

Different explanations are given to the
aims which were set before the meet-
ing, from the initial curses of the
Reykjavik meeting a prompt and
concerted turn was made to words’ of
praise. A hectic campaign started to
misappropriate the other side’s pro-
posals. The main forces were brought
in to defend the SDI that was held up to
shame in Reykjavik. Generally speak-
ing, Washington is now living through
some hectic days.

But what is that? A pre-election game
which needs to picture Reykjavik as a
success? Or are we dealing with an
unpredictable policy for years to come?
This phenomenon needs a serious
study. :

It certainly did not miss our attention
how and where certain political quar-
ters are trying to steer the discussion of
the results of the meeting. The key ele-
ments of that campaign are worth
mentioning. Efforts are being made in a
bid to whitewash the destructive posi-
tion of the US Administration which
came to the meeting unprepared. I
would say one more time, with the old
baggage. But when there was no escap-
ing, and the situation demanded clear
answers, it blasted the possibility for
crowning the meeting with accords. Ef-
forts are being-made, in the new situa-
tion that has taken shape after Reyk-
javik, to compel the USSR to go back to
the old approaches, to pull it back to
fruitless numbers debates, to walking in
circles in the conditions of a deadlock.

Evidently there is no small number of
politicians in the West whom the
Geneva talks suit as a screen, not as a
forum for seeking accords.

What was being thoroughly disguised
previously is now becoming more
clear: among US and West European
ruling circles, there are powerful forces
which seek to frustrate the process of
nuclear disarmament. Some people
began to assert again that nuclear
weapons are almost a boon.

A half of the truth is the most danger-
ous lie, as a saying goes. It is very
disquieting that not only mass media of
rightist trends but ranking figures of the
US Administration as well have taken
such a stand and at times a stand of
downright deception, too.

I have already had the opportunity to
relate how the matters stood in Reyk-
javik. We had arrived for the meeting
with constructive and the most radical
arms reduction proposals in the entire
history of Soviet-US negotiations. The
proposals take into account the in-
terests of both sides.

Upon arriving in Iceland I told this on
the eve of the meeting in a conversation

Below: Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, and
their note-takers, confer at Reykjavik to little avail.

with the leaders of that country. Al-
ready in the middle of the first conver-
sation with the President of the United
States, the proposals were handed over
to him.

Far-reaching and interconnected,
they constitute an integrated package
and are based on the programme, an-
nounced on January 15, for the elim-
ination of nuclear weapons by the year
2000.

The first proposal is to cut down by
half all strategic arms without excep-
tion.

The second proposal is fully to elim-
inate Soviet and US medium-range
missiles in Europe and immediately to
set about talks on missiles of this type in
Asia as well as on missiles with a range
of less than a thousand kilometres. We
suggested freezing the number of such
missiles immediately.

The third proposal is to consolidate
the regime of the ABM Treaty and to
start full-scale talks on a total ban on
nuclear tests.

It was on the basis of the Soviet
proposals that discussions in Reykjavik
began, which I described in detail in my
previous speeches.

As a result of laborious efforts and
acute arguments, the two sides’ posi-
tions drew reassuringly closer together
on two out of three directions.

The logic of the talks brought the
sides to determining concrete periods
for the elimination of strategic offensive
arms. Together with President Ronald
Reagan we agreed that such arms of the
USSR.and the USA can and must be
fully eliminated by the year 1996.

An accord was also reached on com-
plete elimination of *US and Soviet
medium-range missiles in Europe and
on a radical cut in the missiles of this
class in Asia.

We attach fundamental importance
to these accords between the USSR
and the United States: they have shown
that nuclear disarmament is possible.

Chronology of latest
Soviet peace initiatives:

JULY 30, 1985

Pravda published the text of
Mikhail Gorbachev's statement.
“The Soviet Union has decided
to unilaterally stop all nuclear
explosions beginning August 6,
1985,” the Soviet leader said.
“Our moratorium will continue
until January 1, 1986.”

AUGUST 28, 1985

Interviewed by Time magazine,
Gorbachev said: ‘‘What’s bad
about our making persistent
efforts to break the deadlock at
the arms control talks? This is
also the aim of our moratorium
on nuclear explosions”’.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

In a French television inter-
view, he said: ‘‘We have really
reached a very critical point

in the development of the inter-
national situation. This is not

a pessimistic position but a
realistic appraisal of a real situ-
ation. And this gives rise to the
need to look for solutions .. .
capable of ending the arms race
and creating conditions for a
reduction and subsequent elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons.”

OCTOBER 4, 1985

Gorbachev and French Presi-
dent Mitterand held a joint
press conference in Paris at
which the Soviet leader said:
“The Soviet Union is prepared
to make radical reductions in
nuclear weapons if a ban is
placed on the deployment of
nuclear weapons in space.”

NOVEMBER 19-21, 1985

Gorbachev met Reagan in
Geneva. ‘‘We unilaterally sus-
pended all nuclear explosions,”’

e said. ‘“‘And we also reiter-
ated our unilateral moratorium
on the testing of antisatellite
weapons and submitted radical
proposals for a reduction of
nuclear arsenals.”

DECEMBER 27, 1985

Speaking to foreign ambas-
sadors, Gorbachev said: ‘‘We
urged and are urging the
United States to follow the
Soviet Union’s good example
and stop all nuclear explosions.
If the two biggest powers joined
forces on a matter of such great
importance for all humankind,
it would really be a step of
historic significance.”’

e Continued on next page

Such is the first half of the truth about
the Reykjavik meeting.

But there is also the other half and it
consists in the fact, as I have already
said, that the US side frustrated an ag-
reement which, it seemed, was quite
near at hand.

The US Administration is now trying
in every way to convince people that a
possible major success with reaching
concrete agreements was not achieved
owing to the unyieldingness of the
Soviet side over the programme of the
so-called Strategic Defence Initiative
(SDD.

It is being even asserted that we al-
legedly lured the president into a trap
by putting forward ‘breathtaking’ pro-
posals on cutting down strategic offen-
sive arms and medium-range missiles,
and that later on we ostensibly de-
manded in an ultimatum form that the
SDI be renounced.

But the essence of our stand and of
our proposals is as follows: We are for
the reduction and then complete elimi-
nation for nuclear weapons and are
firmly against a new stage of the arms
race and against its transfer to outer
space.

Hence we are against the SDI and are
for the consolidation of the ABM
Treaty.

It is clear to every sober-minded per-
son that if we embark upon the road of
deep cuts and, then, complete elim-
ination of nuclear weapons, it is essen-
tial to rule out any possibility which
could be used by either the Soviet or
US side for gaining unilateral military
superiority.

We perceive the main danger of the
SDI precisely in a transfer of the arms
race to a new sphere, and in an en-
deavour to go out into outer space with
offensive arms and thereby to achieve
military superiority.

The SDI has become an obstacle to
ending the arms race, to getting rid of
nuclear weapons, and is the main obs-
tacle to a nuclear-free world.

When Mr. Shultz, US Secretary of
State, tells the American people that
the SDI is a sort of ‘‘insurance policy”
for America, this, to say the least, is an
attempt at misleading the American
people.
~ Yn actual fact, the SDI does not
strengthen America’s security but, by
opening up a new stage of the arms
race, destabilizes the military-politic
situation and thereby weakens both the
United States, security and universal
security.

The Americans should know this.
They should also know that the U
stand on the SDI, announced in Reyk
javik, basically contradicts the AB

Treaty.

Article 15 of the treaty does not allow
a party to withdraw from the treaty but
only under certain circumstances:
namely, ‘‘if it decides that extra
ordinary events related to the subject
matter of this treaty have jeopardiZ
its (party to the treaty) supreme
interests’’.

There have been and are no such
extraordinary events. It is understan®
able that the elimination of nucle
weapons, if started, would make thé
emergence of such extraordina!
events still less probable. M

This is logical. Article 13 of the AB™
Treaty also stipulates that the side*
should ‘‘consider, as appropriate,
sible proposals for further incre
the viability of this treaty.” The US :
the contrary, is seeking to deprecia!
the treaty, deprive it of its meaning: 5

There are all quotations from th
document signed by the top rep”
resentative of the United States. | 15

Many a tale has been invented ,
raise the SDI’s prestige. One of the™ i
that the Russians are terribly afraid ch

it. Another is that it is ee

sin?

$2 e PACIFIC TRIBUNE, NOVEMBER 26, 1986