La AUT 1 Election 88 SULT Corporate spending blitz, divisions over Quebec gave Tories m at hen the elec- tion results aie tallied up, the Con- servatives won a maj- ority of seats in Parlia- ment, 169 out of 295. But they lost the popular vote (the referendum on free trade) by six million votes (the combined tally of the Liberals and the NDP) to five million (the Tory vote). Forty-three per cent of the popular vote is not a majority and not a mandate for free trade or the neo-conservative sellout of Canada. For those who wish to play a strictly parliamentary game, 18 of the Tory seats were won by fewer than 1,000 votes; 24 by fewer than 2,000 votes. Less than 20,000 votes, out of nearly 12 million cast, separ- ated the Tories from a majority of seats and a minority of seats. Placed yet another way, if parliamentary seats were allocated according to votes cast, pro-free trade and anti-free trade, the pro- deal forces would have garnered only 88 Seats, while the anti-deal forces would have captured 207. (This examination again raises the demand for proportional repres- entation in Parliament.) The overwhelming sentiment of the voters, including those who opted for the Tories, was for maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and social programs. : There can and will be no “healing of the wounds” — to use Brian Mulroney’s clev- erly ideological phrase — to sell out Can- ada. The estimation that the Tories did not win a mandate for the trade agreement lays the basis for our tactics in the on-going fightback of the Canadian people. In gear- ing for the next important stage in that fightback, an in-depth estimation of the fac- tors in the election is called for, Certainly, the main factor leading to the strong Tory showing may be summarized as the unprecedented expenditure of adver- tising money by big business on behalf of the Tories; unabashed media manipulation, which sowed confusion over the impact of the trade agreement — all of which was able to off-set the work done by the pepular forces. All of this calls for demands by the democratic movement for curbs on election spending by corporations, and big business institutes, curbs on the misuse and abuse of polls during election campaigns, and reform of media which slanted the news in favour of the Tories and the trade deal. The general economic climate also tended to favour the Tories. While there are regional economic difficulties and serious problems related to wealth distribution which we pointed to during the campaign, the delayed cyclical downturn in the econ- omy allowed the Tories to take credit for an expanding capitalist economy. Weaknesses in the political opposition to the Tories also need to be noted. A clearly articulated alternative to free trade was never presented. The NDP, which at one point appeared headed for a historic breakthrough, decided to fight the election on the need for “honesty” and “trust” in government on behalf of “average” or “ordinary” Canadi- ans. This strategy of backing away from the trade deal, except for its impact on social programs, flew in the face of a year-and-a- half campaign by the pro-Canada forces demanding an election on the deal around the slogan “Let Canadians Decide.” This strategy failed to identify the true 6 « Pacific Tribune, December 5, 1988 Communist Party leader George Hewison. The Communist Party’s assessment of the 1988 federal election Se ia eid neo-conservative nature of the Tories. It blurred the character of the main enemy of -Canada’s working people and Canadian sovereignty — the transnational corpora- tions and their pro-U.S. voice: Mulroney and his Conservative Party. reoccupied with the polls, the NDP listed the trade deal a dis- tant fourth in its campaign plank, and seemed resigned to jockey with the Lib- erals for the runner- uP position. John Turner, on the other hand, a repre- sentative of a certain section of big business, was able to rally Canadians who were opposed to the deal by promoting its defeat as the “cause of his life.” But again, Turner’s alternatives were very much limited to a critique of Mulroney and the trade deal and failed to offer a comprehensive package to Canadians who were genuinely confused by the neo-conservative propaganda jugger- naut. There were also serious splits in the Liberal Party, reflecting the splits within big business itself. An important factor in the election out- come was the relationship of the Meech Lake Accord to the trade deal. Mulroney was able to appear as champion of French Canadian rights in Quebec because both the Liberals and the NDP had ended up endors- ing the Accord. Asa result, the true nature of the Accord as the companion piece to the trade deal was never fully revealed, and sharp differ- ences in both the Liberals and the NDP manifested themselves during the cam- paign, particularly outside of Quebec, dif- ferences which could be interpreted as ignoring the national rights of Quebec. In fact, during the campaign, a serious crisis arose within the NDP over minority language rights, with at least three separate interpretations of NDP policy surfacing: that Quebec should be able to invoke the “notwithstanding” clause in the Charter of Rights to protect the French language in Quebec (a clause that has been used against labour); that the “notwithstanding” clause must not be used against the English- Canadian minority in Quebec; and Broad- bent’s position about differences in “nuances” between the two diametrically Opposite viewpoints. The confusion between minority lan- guage rights and the tights of nations, including the right to self-determination (both needing the protection of the constitu- tion) Played into right-wing Tory hands. The right wing, especially the Tories, and Lucien Bouchard, on the other hand, were able to play an old saw about “rich Onta- rio” selfishly being in Opposition to free trade, appealing to French-Canadian nation- alism, and mistrust of Ontario. jority This, plus the lack of a realistic political alternative, given Bourassa’s and Parizeau'’s | support for the trade deal made the out | come in Quebec a virtual certainty, despilé | the new-found support by Quebec trade unions for the NDP. Bickering between the two major parties opposed to the deal also contributed to the Tory victory. The Liberals, despite theif pro-Canada stance, expended considerable effort in NDP strongholds attempting 10 | dislodge — in some cases successfully — | incumbents. The NDP for its | .part helped confuse its supporters and working people gen erally by attacks 00 | the Liberal initiative | to block the trade deal through the ust of the Senate, talk of a coalition with the Tories, and speculation _ on the advantages of the demise of the Lib- eral Party. Here the Communist Party needs to con” _ sider self critically whether it failed at al earlier stage to’sharpen the debate around the need to mobilize the trade union move" ment against free trade. Our desire for unity caused us to give insufficient attention to thé need to struggle with those who argued against mobilization. In future, the mobil _ zation of the working class will be decisiV€ in off-setting the kind of power and money of big business we witnessed in this election: Our party’s campaign to “Save Canada — Defeat the Tories” was in tune with the needs of the moment. In fact, right-wing columnist for the Toronto Sun, Lubor J: Zink, noted the following: “Before adjout™ ing comment on what has been dubbed as Canada’s ‘historic decision’ to electio® postmortems,” he wrote, “a few words OF the one minor gap in the otherwise seamles saturation coverage of pre-election happe” ings I mentioned a while ago. “I am referring to the apparently unn® ticed omission of Moscow’s eager pawn an pusher of Soviet policy objectives in this country, the Communist Party of Canada, from listings, descriptions and analytic4 examinations of organizations opposing tht FTA with the U.S. “Yet, together with the cluster of radical leftist groups (at the head of them may be# more accurate description), the CPC has been among the most ardent opponents any free trade deal in North America loné before John Turner chose to gamble his anything goes, last-ditch attempt at politic comeback on a demagogic, scaremongering crusade against the FTA.” Our own estimation of our role is som® what more modest than that attributed bY Zink. Nevertheless our alternative based 0” Survival, Sovereignty, and Social Justi was widely endorsed by those we contact® as a necessary component of the movemen to defeat the Tories and neo-conservatis™ Our party’s campaign had three related objectives. We attempted to block ¢ return of a Tory majority government, an 5 to expose the face of Toryism. In this, 04 party did good work given our size ee; resources. We must acknowledge that vy came up short, having underestimated es ability of big business to rally behind ¢ Tories in such unprecedented fashion. Second, we entered the race to place ay alternative before the Canadian people, t popular movements in particular. Here were well, and more widely, received. Third, we set out to builda stronger bas? for our party. This was accomplished ie many new recruits, friends and contae were made.