Studying in the woods personal association with Mobutu fostered the ese support of FNLA. Roberto has also received d from the World Council of Churches and some arms from Romania, but its largest and most’ consis- nt source of revenue, se caaie. feat arms and Complete political backing has come from bao ~The FNLA at one Foint was thought to have the Strongest military force of the three liberation move- Ments with a standing army of 33,000, including 15,000 ned in the last year by Chinese advisers in Zaire. FNLA forces are’ Zairian (Sempre Fixe, Lisbon, July 9, 1975). But now with the armies of the FNLA and MPLA put to the test in major battles in Angola, PLA has been given the undisputed military superi- ty. The only territory in which FNLA can claim ength is in the Bakohgd region of northern Angola, and this is presently being challenged by the josie A never developed the social infrastructure or Olitical cadres like those of the MPLA, and oe NLA soldiers, though they may be welt equipped, lac ideological: training needed to arm them ee Current phase of the fighting. Increasing numbers Of FNLA soldiers are defecting to the MPLA (800 ‘Since July) and they report stories of forced re- CTuitment of all Angolan refugees in Zaire to the eh Le i e one could liberate Angola. Political discussions bake iscouraged and soldiers were admonished i sim follow orders (Afrique-Asie, Paris, Aug. 11, 1975). 5 i : p“ against Por- uring the 14 years of “struggle” against * 0 Uguese colonialism, Roberto has remained in exile in irmed de the Angolan capital and there are no confirme Orts that ie has been inside Angola during this r -FNLA, and as we will see from an ideological nt of view UNITA is much closer to t an it is to MPLA. Usually labelled the. 8 anization in Angola by the wes , UNI ‘had no major role to play in the last ee nths of fighting during which time raha fat “litical power have been drawn. It is signif Bee "yY Jonas Savimbi, president of UNITA, was oderate”’ At least one report claims that more than 60% of the — . At the time of this writing, he has not set foot The third group, UNITA, began a8 an offshoot of he FNLA UNITA: attend the OAU summit in Kampala during the sum- mer months of pitched battles between the MPLA and FNLA. “UNITA was: formed in March 1966, two years after Jonas Savimbi left the FNLA and then subsequently tried to join MPLA but was denied membership. Orig- inally his base of operation was in Lusaka, but he was expelled after his troops damaged the Ben- - guela railroad, a critical Zambian link to the coast. After some time spent in Cairo, Savimbi re-entered eastern Angola, where he is said to have built an army of supporters some 40,000 strong, especially among the Ovimbundu, his own ethnic group. Of this 40,000 it was said that perhaps only a fraction of them, perhaps 5-6,000 maximum, were armed. Savimbi has often boasted that UNITA is the only liberation group to operate solely in Angola, but lacking rear areas and financial and military support leaves ‘UNITA the weakest of the liberation movements. 4 [. has been suggested more than once that the Portuguese allowed the militarily weak UNITA to op- erate in the eastern region to sow confusion among the Angolan people and to increase friction between the two other movements fighting for political super- jority. Even more sinister and direct links with the Portuguese fascists formerly in power were learned through documents indicating that Savimbi had been an agent of the Portuguese at least since 1972, and that he effectively supported and: carried out Portuguese policies, the chief one being the destruction of the MPLA. It is fully consistent with these revelations that UNITA’s front was opened in the eastern -region where the MPLA was successfully operating and that some of its major attacks were against MPLA bases and not against the Portuguese. - : UNITA has never: been a major contender for pow- er in Angola. Its long isolation in Angolan politics is reflected in the OAU’s delay in recognizing the move- ~ ment until its 1974 session. After the coup in Portu- gal, the Lisbon’s government’s desire to appear un- biased in Angolan liberation movement politics forced it to give equal recognition to unequal forces and UNITA. was considered on the same basis as MPLA and FNLA. UNITA was part of the Transitional Gov- ernment, which has since crumbled, and in a real’ sense that was the closest UNITA has come or prob- ably will come to the centers of Angolan political power. ‘Finally, immediately following the change of re- gime in Portugal, a number of new political parties emerged in Angola. Some 30 new political groupings NS \ were reported a little more than a month after the April coup. The influence of these parties, mainly spawned by white Angolans, was never appreciable and now these groups have been eclipsed by the larger power struggle between MPLA and FNLA and by tens of ~ thousands of white Angolans who are leaving the country. Too often, the ideological differences between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA are overlooked or sub- merged in a desire to see some kind of magical unity among them take place. But despite the Algarve agreements and despite numerous unity pacts among the three movements, no meaningful or lasting agree- -ments have been effected. Why? Is it the fault of the agreements or are there irreconcilable political differ- ences between the movements? l. Africa today, many leaders claim to be ‘“‘social- ist,” but often this is not much more than political rhetoric and each political situation must. be exam- ined carefully for the material conditions behind the rhetoric of socialism. Many African leaders speak of “‘socialism’’ while in fact their ‘‘independent’’ regimes have opened their doors to foreign investors and neo- colonial machinations. Other African leaders have taken serious steps to eliminate neocolonialist and imperial- ist interests and have launched economic, political and social programs that are leading towards socialism. Unfortunately, there are far more examples of the former tendency than the latter, and this ratio is re- flected in ‘Angolan politics as well. Both FNLA and UNITA’s leaders speak of ‘‘so- cialism’”’ for Angola, no doubt because it is a -legiti- mate desire and concern of their constituencies. Both Roberto and Savimbi advocate a ‘‘mild’’ form of socialism‘ that is ‘‘rooted in Angolan customs and tra-_ ditions.”’ Holden Roberto has said the FNLA wants Angola to have a kind of socialism ‘‘with a human face” that would respect private property, private initiative and basic freedoms while operating an economic system geared to self-management by the entire Angolan people. In other words, what Roberto would like is _ Socialism in name and capitalism in practice. Jonas Savimbi says UNITA wants a mixed econ- omy because ‘‘private enterprise can bring about rapid development” (Guardian, London, March 29, 1975). With this perspective it is thus not surprising that Savimbi emerged as the ‘‘darling’’ of the white busi-— ness community in Angola and as the favorite in the South African newspapers after the Portuguese coup. It — was reported that after the summer of heavy fighting — in which UNITA did not fare too well, Savimbi was in England trying to drum up business interests in south- ern Angola in the event of secession. Even prior to ~ the coup in Portugal, Savimbi was receiving favorable __ coverage in the U.S. A series of articles on UNITA _ ‘by Washington Post journalist, Leon Dash, won the Pulitzer Prize in 1974. No such series was ever run in _ a U.S. newspaper on the MPLA. : Roberto and Savimbi claim they are “‘socialists” but _ disclaim any similarities between their socialism and the “‘doctrinaire approach” of Neto of the MPLA. This is certainly true — Neto does not speak of socialism __ with private investment nor does MPLA speak of a special type of Angolan socialism free of class contra- dictions. MPLA stands alone in Angola as the move- ment which has consistently identified and opposed im- Perialism as the main. enemy, and MPLA stands alone as the only revolutionary Angolan movement. As a revolutionary organization its political program does not end with the elimination of Portuguese colon- __ ialism but extends to the barring of neocolonialism . in Angola and the social transformation of the country. ‘MPLA has said that as long as there is colonialism or neocolonialism in Angola there will be war, and if Roberto or the FNLA seize power in Angola the war will go on. MPLA has always maintained a non-racial view of the anti-colonial struggle, and MPLA militants were taught to fight Portuguese colonialism and not the — f Portuguese people. This view has been extended to white Angolans, many of whom in the cities are MPLA activists. The ideological choice in the current phase of the struggle then is between independence and neocolonial- _ ism for Angola under FNLA or UNITA, or independence with socialism for Angola under the MPLA. PACIFIC TRIBUNE—DECEMBER 19, 1975—Page 11