| MAX WERNER WRITES: Victory In 1943 Possible Alllied Invasion Of C ETWEEN July 5, when the German troops in the Belgorod-Orel sector launched this year’s offensive, and Aug. 15, when these lines were waitten; the world was flooded by sweeping military 'and political events: the Ger- “man offensive in Russia, the Allied landing in Sicily, Mus- solini’s downfall, the Russian counter-offensive. ‘These latest happenings prove that the war in Europe can and must still be won before 1943 is over. The battles and the radical ehanges that have taken place during the summer of 1943, con- firm the conclusions of my book A@fack Can Win in 1943, (com- pleted on May 10 of this year). They were the result of the pre- ceding war developments which f therein described and analyzed. The dramatic week of July 5 to July 12 on the Russian front showed conclusively that the Red army’s defense methods are ‘su- perior to the German offensive. The German offensive, planned as an overwhelming blow, col- lapsed in a single week The Spearhead of the German army was broken. One and for all the offensive Strensth of the German army for large-scale, decisive }actions. There followed the Allied Iland- ing in Sicily and the conquest of the island. Now it was estab- lished that the invasion can be realized. If the invasion of Sicily Was possible, then it is also pos- sible to invade southern Europe. Sicily was the best fortified key position of the entire German- Italian defense of Southern Eur- ope. The German troops had en- fenched themselves on the island since the beginning of 1941. The battle for Sicily in itself WaS an action of limited scope. 8ut it generated events of the greatest strategic effect. The bat- de for Italy was won in the bat- fe for Sicily. Mussolini's down- fall signified the breakup of the military and political structure % the Axis and Italy's impend- ag elimination from the war. this opens breath-taking perspec- aves for Anglo-American strat- *sy in the Mediterranean: the mvasion of southern Europe has tow become possible at any 2oint, from the mouth of the Danube to the Spanish-French dorder. @ JPANWHILE the Red army’s counter-offensive gathered speed: In the area between Orel, Sryansk and Kharkoy the Red amy defeated the strongest Ger- Han army concentrations. Here he most powerful forces of the German army succumbed first to die Russian defenses and then 10 the Russian offensive. ‘The tector of the German front which WaS most important and com- jletely saturated with arms, was split wide open. It was unprece- dented that the German army WaS on the defensive and in re- Teat in Russia as early as July ind August. Unquestionably the ted army will wage other great i | NEW LOW PRICE _THE SOVIETS EXPECTED IT By Anna Louise Strong 35 cents * _UNIVERSAL NEWS 138 East Hastings Vancouver ij Attack can and must win in 1943—that is what this noted military writer says in this article reprinted from Soviet Russia Today offensive actions in still other frent sectors. The crisis of German Strategy has come to a head. Not only was the German army beaten in Russia and Sicily. German strat egy committed virtually criminal miscalculations in war planning. I predicted in my book that Ger- man strategy would make more blunders. It did, during the sum- mer of 1943) and it will make still more, up to the end. What happened is that the Ger- man high command had no well- balanced over-all plan. Again, as in 1941 and 1942, Hitler was a prisoner of his eastern strategy —anl offensive in the east at all cost. But the short-lived, badly calculated offensive in Russia brought about the trouble in the south: Instead of defending the approaches to the European coasts the German army launched a new strategic yenture in Rus- Sia. Hitler lost Sicily and Ttaly at Orel and Belgorod. The gates of Fortress Europe Were simultaneously cracked open from the outside and opened from the inside. It emerged that Hitler had no plan Whatever for the defense of the Eurepean con- tinent. The art of Strategy con- sists of disposing one’s forces so that vital military foals can be attained, either for the defen- Sive or for the offensive. But German Strategy could neither defend nor attack. The German soldier still fought tenaciously, but in a position rendered hope- less in advance by his own lead- ership. Any army is bound to collapse under such eircum- stances. E ) NOY the hour has struck for j the anti-Hitler coalition to exploit all of Hitler’s coalition to to combine all their own efforts im unified and decisive action for victory. Today all chances of military and political Strategy are now closely interlinked. Upris- ings and sabotage in Italy, the Balkans and France Signify the military disorganization of the Whole German defense system in southern Europe. Total War de- Mands an orderly and secure tear. Organized defense at long distances is impossible if the hin- terland is on fire The critical zones of German defense are closely interrelated. The disintegration of southern and southeastern Europe threat- ens the southern flank of the Through ontinent German front in the Soviet Union. Once the Balkans and the Danube valley are made insecure by sat- ellite desertion, the opposition of the betrayed masses and An- glo-American pressure, the Ger- man armies in southern Russia will have no ayenue of retreat. Their communication lines run for the most part through south- eastern Europe. They might get into a trap from which there is no escape. Events in the summer of 1943 call for solution. The war can be Won quickly if the Anglo-Am- erican forces are taken to the European continent and £0 into action without delay. The Ger- Man defense system of the Euro- pean continent has already been unhinged; now it must be com- pletely upset. In the early fall of 1943 the anti- Hitler coalition has new trump cards which it did not have in the spring. Today it is more than ever evident that the Third Reich will not be able to with- stand a combined Anglo-Am- erican-Soviet onslaught against the European continent, Never before has an offensive Anglo-American strategy had its present opportunity, for the sub- Stance of the German army. is not only being tied down and bled white on the Russian front, it is also being crushed by the active Russian offensive. That is whete the greatest opportunity ies. The tempo of military events is now counted by weeks — and every week counts. Britain Is A\n /\rsenal--- Invade From Britain U NDERESTIMATION of the enemy is an organic defect not only of the Hitler- ite strategy but of Hitlerite policy as a whole. Incident- ally, Hitler also has under- rated Britain’s military and economic possibilities. The “learned” ists have deluded themselves with an illusion about the decline of British economy compared with German economy. Up to a certain period England’s behavior seemed to afford eyery reason for Hitler's Smug optimism. But the Hitlerite offensive in the West which start- ed on May 10, 1940, put an end to the Munich “illusion.” The Churchill government then came to power and there began an energetic mobilization of re- Sources for defense needs. The mobilization proceeded in rather difficult and complex conditions. The Soviet Union saved Britain from the threat of invasion. Fol- Icwing the outbreak of the Soviet German war the bombing of Bri- tain ceased. England was given the opportunity under exception- ally favorable conditions to set all its machinery for military and ec- onomic mobilization into motion. Unquestionably close coopera- tion with the United States helped Britain to develop mass produc- tion of all types of arms and mu- nitions, and {o eliminate her lag- ging behind Germany. But a de- cisive role here is played by some of the resources of British econ- omny—the existence of a powerful production apparatus, the exist- ence of a numerous army of high- ly skilled workers, the tradition- al practices of British industry in German econom-- By E. Lemin That twenty times less tonnage is needed to land and supply an invasion force on the western coast of Europe than for a simi- lar operation in the Medi- terranean is the assertion made in this article, con- densed from Pravda, the Soviet newspaper. respect to high quality production, Tich organizational experience and flexibility in adjusting itself to new conditions. The active support given by: the working class to the country’s war efforts, its wide interest in achiev- ing speedy victory in the just war against Hitlerite Germany and its accomplice is an important factor in Britain’s military industrial successes. 4peDes the production of arms and munitions in Britain is in- tended to supply big armies en- gaged in violent battles. However, the absence of a second front on the European continent has re- sulted in a disproportion between War production and the scale of military operations. At the same time the very logic of military production calls for the military application of the ma- terial produced. For Britain, this is all the more essential inasmuch as she has already reached the highest point of war production to a_certain extent, inasmuch as the protraction of the war cannot but affect her economic sources as a Whole and inasmuch as public op- inion is definitely in favor of a speedy victory in the War which has been going on for four years. The importance of the British War arsenal is considerably en- hanced as a result of the geo- graphic strategic factor. The Brit- ish Isles are not only a powerful arsenal, but also the main base for the invasion of the European continent. It is the shortest route from here to the heart of Ger- many, to the lair of the fascist beast. The main Allied forces are stationed on the British Isles. Not only the main forces of the army, navy and bomber craft, but also a powerful fighter cover would en- sure the invasion of the continent from the British Isles. Twenty times less tonnage is needed to land and supply a divi- Siol on the western coast of Eur- ope than for a similar operation in the Mediterranean. Modern Warfare demands a continuous mass of supplies, weapons, muni- tions, reinforcements. provisions. The outcome of battles depend on the scale and continuity of sup- plies. Hence the proximity of the main war base to the field of bat- tle is of tremendous importance in achieving’ decisive and speedy successes in war. A crushing blow at Germany is hardly possible without the di- rect utilization of the enormous strategic advantages of the Brit- ish Isles as a mighty munitions arsenal and principal base of in- vasion on the continent. By C. A. Saunders ie is hard for employers to get away from the old relation- ship with employees, The outworn idea that labor is merely a tool of production and can have no interest other than wages still prevails to a large extent, and it is this very shortsighted poliey which has militated against Ja- bor’s full participation in the war and threatens to lead to indus- trial and social chaos in the peace. Organized labor has striven during the war years to become a full partner in war production. Backward employers have not en- couraged full Cooperation. Al- though labor-management produc- tior committees have been en- Gorsed by the government, and have stepped up production tre- mendously wherever they have functioned, they have not been encouraged, and in some cases have been sabotaged by manage- ments. These employers still re- Sard production as their concern, and resent what they consider en- croachment on the functions of Management by labor. & ig the procedure being followed in Vancouver shipyards is any indication of the manner in which post-war problems are going to be tackled, it is evident that or- ganized labor must insist on be- ing consulted. Here is a case where circumstances are, accord- ing to Wartime Merchant Ship- ping, slowing down the proauc- tion of cargo yessels. The explan- ation offered is that higher pri- ority work has the first call on labor and material and that there will be no, layoff but merely a transfer. But what is happening in the process? An immediate reversion to the old big-stick methods. Fir- ing of absentees and so-called loafers, who are for the most part victims and products of manage- ment’s own inefficiency. Organized labor was kept com- pletely in the dark and it was cnly aS a result of persistent pres- sure that the unions obtained a meeting with the operators and representatives of Wartime Mer- chant Shipping. But at this meet- ing there was no offer of coopera- tien, no acknowledgement of la- bor’s concern in these vyital changes, despite the fact that di- rect yiolations of supplementary agreements are involved. In fact, it became evident that the opera- tors’ idea of a reversion to the six-day week presupposes reten- tion of the present agreement, sc that skeleton crews may take care of Sunday work at straight time rates of pay. The consequence of this whole method of procedure has been the creation and spreading of con- fusion and defeatism among the workers. Rumors are rife through- out the yards, and despite assur- ances to the contrary, layoffs con- tinue. National Selective Service seems to be a sleeping parnter im the whole affair. Organized labor must insist on consultation and a voice in all major production ehanges, and Where such changes involve signed agreements, as in the pres- ent case, such changes can only be sanctioned when new hours of work are agreed upon through negotiation. Aw od