The great wartime developments in the

Canadian Northwest and Alaska consti-
tute a realization of Stefansson’s predic-
tions and provide an opportunity for even

greater achievements tomorrow.
€

\ By PAUL BJARNASON

ska and the Canadian Northwest—Our New Frontier—By
Hold Griffin—W. W. Norton—221 pp. Dlustrated—$3.50.

j

| ERE is a timely book on a vast neglected area of our own
*- continent which is belatedly engaging the attention of

srmments and industrialists, to say nothing of the height-

@1 attraction it has for large numbers of Canadians and
Mericans. Ihe economic and strategic importance of Alaska
™@ the Canadian Northwest in the accomplishment of victory

in the integration of international affairs after the war

Hild not be underestimated.
}e legend about the prohib-

m climate of the Arctic and
mretie regions has stubborn-
= rsisted through the centuries
m up to the present, despite
= remendous developments in
Soviet Far North, has been
“jtent factor in discouraging
“iment and exploitation of ap-
famately one half of North
Mica. As a consequence, our
northern hinterlands until
telast few years have been
tly unknown, their mineral
»h ignored.
astward the course of em-
m@takes its way’ was the slo-
i. Short generation ago when
imur Stefansson and I sat
@ier in a little country school
> akota. The Ptolemaic con-
@n of the Arctic still held
™ and the rare reports about
summer days, open water
fyesetation in the Far North
@ classed with other tall tales
= made Anterestings reading
2i0 more.
); known facts that Eskimos
Bited the Arctic had little
‘e against the old doctrines
Bvas not therefore associated
the idea of a native food
7. Even the conclusions of
f2w white men who went to
Far North and remained
by choice made but little
‘SSion on the prevailing be-
while the more famous ex-
°sS who managed to suryive
ieir “civilized” rations re-
dq little changed in their at-
—the country was harsh
nhospitable, unfit for exten-
settlement and development.
50, until yesterday, the nor-
| territories were relegated
Sie background of the de-
ing Canadian and American

in the meantime, Stefans-
jon was growing up and
Se:ding one generally accept-
Mea after another as incom-
Kile with the known but ig-
@ facts. Gifted with a scien-
bent, he refused to be
@i2d entirely by the orthodox
@>opular beliefs. Among other
@s, he reasoned that Certain
fal and marine: life, knowing
ng about the Arctic Circle,
il] probably range beyond it
-utter unconcern for orthodox
Bis. He studied available
# on sea currents and winds
Bi served to strengthen his
fusions, and thus fortified,
t out to learn the facts.

yr

# took no provisions along
720 equipment except a rifie
ssome ammunition and after
filing some years far beyond
Arctic Circle he wrote The
idly Aretiec in 1913 and, nine
© later, The  Northward
mse of Empire, both of which
‘ Dow become accepted text-
FS on the north.

Stefannson has been tireless in
pointing out the potentialities of
the north. He was the first to
see and proclaim the logie of
the northern routes for ‘world
travel. He anticipated present
sensational advancements in avi-
ation and championed the polar
route as being not only the
shortest but, for many reasons,
the best route between points in
the northern hemisphere.

Now, as an outcome of the war,
many of the things Stefansson
predicted and for which he
fought have been accomplished.
And the story of their accom-
plishment, in all of its national
and international significance, is
told in Harold Griffin’s Alaska
and the Canadian Northwest—
Gur New Frontier.

LASKA and the Canadian
Northwest is partially in
rarrative form and therefore
erips the reader as no purely

academic work can, but it is es-
sentially factual and descriptive.

It bristles with information, not
only about the physical aspects
ef the vast and sparsely peopled
regions from Norman Wells to
Whitehorse and from Edmonton
to Nome, but also about the activ-
ities and aspirations of such in-
habitants as there are and the
soldiers and war workers whose
achievements have transformed
the entire country. The great
Peace River district, the Atha-
baska oil sands, the expanding
network of airlines, the Canol
Project, the Alaska Highway, the
mining and fishing industries and
the possibilities of agricultural
development are among the
questions discussed with minute-
ness and understanding.

In short, it gives a picture in
perspective and in comparison
with the Soviet north of a coun-
try with all the potentialities of
an empire. So vivid is this pic-
ture that after reading the book
anyone on the “outside” might go
there with the impression of com-
ing to a familiar place.

But perhaps the most telling
: phase of the work lies in its

indeterminate mass impact.
At this stage in history the pan-
orama of a vast and virgin coun-

try at the very crossreads of the -

world, set vis-a-vis another equal-
ly new and great but far more
developed Siberia presents a
prospect eclipsing all experience.

Tomorrow's inevitable develop-
ments, the opportunity presented-
poses a situation of tremendous
moment to all those whose im-
print will be placed upon the
reconstruction of the world.
Griffin sensed that responsibility
and voices both a warning and
a hope, and his handling of the
subject is of a kind that leaves
a catching touch.

Speaking of the changed atti-
tude since the days of the gold
rush, he says:

“On the changing frontier of
the north men were already
spending less effort in their
search for gold and more in the
quest for industrial metals. They
were thinking less of making a
rich strike and leaving for the

‘eutside’ to make their homes
and more of developing the
country as a place to live. And

‘outside, people who had heard
sO many stories of hardship and
privations in the north that even
the most incredible were often
accepted as fact were beginning
to discover the truth as a result
of the agitation for construction
of a highway to Alaska. They
were finding that even though
many of these stories as related
by men who went into the north
unprepared and ill - equipped
were true, the conclusions drawn
from them were not. Far from
being a frozen country incapable
of supporting a large population,
it was in fact the last great
frontier in North America.”

Few people can associate Alas-
ka and the Yukon with agricul-
ture. Yet Griffin speaks of a
thriving farm colony in the Ma-
tanuska Valley and - successful
gardening throughout the whole
area. Wheat can be ripened in
record time in the rich Tanana
Valley, only a few score miles
from the Arctic Circle. Long
summer hours of daylight com-
pensate for the shorter srowing
season in normal years, and it is
well known that plants can be
adapted to changed climatic con-
ditions, as Soviet scientists have
shown.

SUMMARY of the author’s

own views on the potentiali-
ties of the north is contained in
this quotation:

“If the Peace River Block were
the only area tapped by the
Alaska Highway, the millions of
dollars spent on the road would
represent only a fraction of the
value of the natural resources

How Ten Nazi

he North in Perspective

cpened to development. With the
radium, tungsten and oil of the
Mackenzie District, the  gjold,
silver and copper of the Yukon,
and the gold, tin and antimony
of Alaska, the northwest, of
which the Peace River is only
a part, ts the treasure house of
the continent . . .

“In the course of the war we
have opened up this treasure
house. It has the minerals, the
water power, the oil, the forests
and the potential farm areas. Our
Sigantic task in the postwar
period will be to translate this
latest wealth into terms of cities
and homes and jobs for the peo-
ple will come to build the coun-
ry. Without this it is worthless.”

Griffin cites a number of politi-
eal and economic reasons for the
neglect of the north until the
exigencies of war made prompt
and vigorous action imperative.
Consequently, the necjessary
haste in planning, the last-minute
efforts to compensate for this
neglect, resulted in many and
costly mistakes. The future util-
ity value of the projects at times
conflicted with the military needs
that had to take precedence.

But Griffin is also confident
that despite the mistakes a great
beginning has been made and he
leaves the reader with this op-
timistic thought: 5

“Air lines across the Arctic
and highways through Alaska
have brought the Soviet Union
close to the United States and

Canada. And beyond the Soviet
Union over the Great Circle
route, lies China. Here, In our

-own northwest, we have created

the physical means of realizing
international cooperation, both in
achieving victory and construct
ing the postwar world. Alaska has
become, indeed, the land of op-
portunity.” - =

HERE are several reasons why

I have mentioned Stefans-
son’s name so frequently in this
review. Having spent eleven
years in the scientific exploration
of the far north and written a
number of books of outstanding

HAROLD GRIFFIN

importance on the subject, Stef-
ansson has long been recognized

as an authority. He is a special _

adviser to the United States gov-
ernment on matters relating to
Alaska and the far north gener-
ally. And he was my boyhood
friend and mentor: longs before
his name appeared in Who’s Who.

Alaska and the Canadialn
Northwest is so reminiscent of
Stefansson’s views as expressed
for the past more than two score

‘“yvears that any comment upon it

without bringing out that neces-
Sary comparison would seem to
he incomplete.

As most of Stefansson’s ideas
from the outset have proved to
be well founded, the similarity
of viewpoint expressed by Grif-
fin lends his book a special pres-
tige. Both have the long “per-
spective all too seldom found
and they seem to be in agreement
on all the main problems of the
north.

I would advise those who wish
to enjoy an eyewitness’ account
of the Alaska Highway and the
Canol Project to get Griffin’s
book. A student’s outlook on a
new trend-compeiling situation
jends profit to the pleasure.

The making of history evokes
the writing of many books. This
beok will undoubtedly make a bit
of history.

Yivisions Were

Destroyed on the Dnieper

JRUTURE generations will study
= the great battle of the
Dnieper River where ten Ger-
man divisions were trapped and
liqudated. It is the story once
more of the
strategic plan of the Soviet High
Command, the skill of the gen-
erals, officers and men of the
Red Army.

Captured documents, the testi-
mony of officers who had been
taken prisoner, and above all, the
furious Nazi resistance showed
that the German High Command
had not given up the idea of re-
capturing the Ukraine and re-
appearing on the Dnieper River.

The Hitlerite command plan
was for the Smela-Miranovo are
te play a paramount role in this
operation. They envisaged cut-
ting Soviet positions on the right
bank of this are with the pur-
pose of constantly menacing the
fianks of advancing Soviet units
and arrest their progress west-

ward.
This group was a kind of shield
covering the entire southern

group, for the Germans were as
yet holding Nikopal, Ormeines,
the Krivoi Rog basin and the
Black Sea coast. More than this,
the Germans dreamed of con-

ingenuity of the

verling the Smela-Mironovo are
into a bridgehead for the offens-
ive at the flanks of the Soviet
armies up and down the Dnieper.

During the autumn and winter

the Germans put a great deal
of effort into fortifying this
bridgehead. The Soviet Com-

mand decided that by concentric
operations on two fronts, they
would be able to cut the German
wedge at the base, thus trans-
forming the strongiy fortified
bridgehead into a trap for the
cnemy.

One bleak winter morning So-
viet artillery opened up at the
base of the German wedge.

The massed blow silenced the
main force of the German de-
fense in this sector. Nevertheless,
the infantry had to repulse
ceaseless counter-attacks to fight
their way to the depth of the
German defense battered by our
artillery. 3

The main blow split the Ger-
man divisions in two isolated
parts. Then Col. Gen. Rotmis-
trov’s tank units broke through
the battle-swept area and
thrust into the rear of the Ger-
man defenses, where enemy re-
sistance was not yet crushed.

The Germans originally held

considerable territory with much
elbow room, In the early days
of the encirclement the corri-
dor separating the German divi-
sions from their forces in the
south was only a few miles wide.
The German command dis-
patehed squadsons of transport
planes with fuel and food for
the trapped troops. Strong tank
forees and motorized infantry
Jaunched counter-attacks to break
through to the trapped divisions.
The Germans counter-attacked
on the narrow sector with i100
to 150 tanks from their reserves.
The German high command also
brought up eight tank and sev-
eral infantry divisions from other
sectors of the front.

With this Panzer battering ram

_ the Germans hoped to pierce the

iron ring around their ten divi-
sions. But while repulsing Ger-
mans counter-attacks outside the
ring, Soviet troops continued to
destroy the encircled troops.

Thereupon, the German Com -
mand began to appeal to the en-
circled units to break through
the ring themselves. By that time
the Germans within the ring had
already lost all of their support
points and the surviving units
were crowded onto a small strip
of ground.

it

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