Piin sight. But, after the de-

-: of Nazi Germany, we still
@: a pewerful enemy in the
ific.

»Pespite the serious defeats
@ered by Japan, the United
"ses Office of War Informa-
*, declared in October, 1944,
"> after defeating Nazi Ger-
= 1y, it will take an “absolute
© imum” of 18 months to two
“cts to bring about the un-
= jitional surrender of Japan.
/anada has just as great (if
> Sreater) a stake in the Pa-
© > war as in the European
'. Hor Canada is a Pacific
~@ er, with 600 miles of Pa-
>: eoast line. She was the
of all the United Nations
eclare war on Japan. More
© 2 2,000 Canadians of Win-
i:¢ Grenadiers, sacrificed
-r lives-in the defence of
"ig Keng and hundreds of
fer Canadians are still im-
Wioned by the enemy. Canad-
's came to grips with the
Panese enemy on the Islands
'Kiska and Attu in the Aleu-
1S.

fanada is also one of the

es of offensive operations
* inst Japan. The construc-
1 of the Alaska Highway

| numerous air bases in the
iadian Northwest, stretch-
' to the very borders of Alas-
| today serve as stepping
‘nes on the/northern road to
'cyo. Through the Alaska
| zhway supplies are poured
'> the advanced air and na-

bases in Alaska. It is com-
'n knowledge today that
 usands of planes have been
(wn through this northwest
ite to the Russian Front. In
=- event of the Soviet Union
‘ering the war against Ja-
i these @anadian bases
‘uld assume even greater im-
\ctance.

Before long, large Canadian
yal and mliitary forces will
ne to grips with the enemy

the Pacific. Already plans
2 being laid down at Ottawa,
"= the dispatch of such expe-
‘ionary forces. In September,
44 during a debate on ex-
“nal affairs, Prime Minister
ickenzie King, reiterated in
ie House of Commons; “The
i licy of the Government is to
"e that our appropriate part
taken in the war against
) pan.”

‘As our sons, together with”
Dir allies, grapple with the
hemy in Asia, the Canadian
id United Nations’ people
ce two major tasks. Firstly,
me must brine about the un-
'nditional surrender of the
nemy as speedily as possible
od at a minimum of cost m
‘en and material. Secondly,
le must establish such a demo-
-atic order in postwar Asia,
jat will ensure freedom and
isting peace to all peoples.

) To speed victory in Asia, the
Inited Nations must mobilise
ivery ounce of their available
Ptreneth. While the over-

from the

Volume 1, No.

9, December 30, 1944

> Canada and the Pacific

Canada has a great stake in the Pacific war, for she is a Pacific

power. She has two great tasks—first victory over the Japanese,
secondly te help establish a democratic order in postwar Asia.

whelming preponderance gain-
ed by the United Nations in
men and material over Japan
fives no cause for undue de-
Spondency or alarm, yet the
Strength of our Pacific enemy
must not be underestimated.

JAPAN, through her huge and

easy conquest, has become
a great continental power. She
controls virtually an unbroken
Stretch of the Asiatic main-
land, extending from Man-
churia to Malaya. She has en-
slaved 380 million people. In
order to defeat her, she must
be dislodged from the Asiatic
continent. The renowned mili-
tary expert, Max Werner,
writes; “We must grasp this
Simple truth, that the Japan-
ese Islands are vulnerable from
the Asiatic coasts and not from
the open Pacific. Geographic-
ally speaking, from Austral-
asia and Pearl Harbor we can
see only the endless waves of
the Pacific, but from the coasts
of East Asia we ean see the
Imperial Palace in Tokyo. At
present we are bearing down
opposite direction,
from the west, while Japan
must be attacked from the east,
from bases on or close to the
Asiatie Continent.” (Max Wer-
ner, in ‘“Maclean’s Magazine,”
Aug. 15, 1944.) :

In February, 1944, Admira
Ghester W. Nimitz, Command-
er-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
revealed ‘the strategy of the
United States military and
naval forces, to capture bases
on the China coast to strike at
Japan proper. Admiral Nimitz
declared that “the simple stra-
tegy of the Pacific war” is that
Japan “can be defeated only
from bases in China, because
they (the Japanese) draw food,
jron and other supplies from
Manchuria and China, and as
lone as they have access to
these, they will be difficult to
defeat.’ He further contintfed:
“We want air bases in China
from which we can deliver air
raids—not sporadic ones—but
like those the Germans are re-
ceiving.”

Fience it is perfectly clear,
that despite the brilliant vic-
tories won by the American
Fleet and Air Forces, a contin-
ental offensive from the soil of
China against Japan is direly
needed. Such an operation is the
key to victory in the Pacific.
A continental offensive is just
as important, if not more so,
to shorten the Pacific war, as
the Second Front was to bring
the unconditional surrender of
Germany.

The secret of the United Na-
tions amazing victories in Hur-
ope has been the eoalition war-
a as waged by the Red
Army & the Hast, the Anglo-
‘American forces in the West
and South, and the underground
forces behind the enemy lines.
So far, there exists no such

Ss By Darshan S. Sangha

\/ ES growing POwer comes greater responsibilities.
' Together with the Unite

my. Lhe joint blows of tI

Canada faces a big job ahead.
d Nations, she has yet to win final victory over the
ie United Nations’ armies have brought victory in Europe

fighting coalition in Asia, ex-
cept on paper. Without it,
there can be no speedy victory
in the Pacific.

Far from Jaunching a con-
tinental offensive in Asia, in
the recent past, the United Na-
tions have suffered disastrous
defeats in China. The Japan-
ese have captured the whole of
the Canton-Hankow railway,
and have thus divided free
‘China into two parts and are
not far from realizing their
long cherished dream of es-
tablishinge railway communica-
tions between Singapore and
Manchuria.

©

Fok eight lone years, the gal-

lant people of China have
braved the odds and held the
first line of democracy in Asia.
Indeed, China is bled white by
a protracted war. But despite
her military and economic
weaknesses and numerous other
handicaps, the lack of unity

between the Koumintange and -

the Chinese Communists has
been the major cause of her
catastrophic defeats.

‘The events that led to the
recall of General Stillwell from
the China-Burma-India thea-
ter of war, in November, 1944,
attests to this crisis of dis-
unity. It is a known fact now
that half a million of the best
troops of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek, instead of engaging
the advancing Japanese in
South China, are employed in
blockading the North China
Guerilla areas.

Much of the arms and am-
muntion dispatched by the Al-
lies is being hoarded by Chung-
king to fight a renewed civil
war against the Communists.
These facts are substantiated
by Madame Sun Yat Sen, the
revered widow of the founder
of the present day Republic of
China, when she warned the
world in a statement issued in
February, 1944: “Reaction and
fascism are strong in China...
This is proved by the diversion
of part of our National Army
to the blockading of the guer-
rilla areas, by the oppression
of the peasantry, and by the
absence of a true labor move-
ment. Some Chinese are
preparing to destroy the guer-
rilla bases in North Shensi.”—
(New Masses, New York, Feb.
1944.) :

National unity in China, be-
tween the Kuomintang, the
Gommunists and all other anti-
Japanese forces, is a pre-
requisite condition: to victory.
The renewal of a civil war at
this erucial period would be
fatal. Therefore it is a prob-
lem, not for the Chinese people
alone, but for all the United
Nations. Hven during the Cairo
Conference, press dispatches
reported that “the conference
tool: cognizance of the fact that
internal differences between
Chaing Kai-shek and the Chi-

nese Communists must be ovex~

come before China could be
opened as the primary base otf
direct attack against Japan it-
self.” (As quoted by Edgaz
Snow, in “People on Our Side,”
pp 301-302:)

©
|* THE India-Burma theater

of operations, we find a
similar situation. The political
strife between Britain and In-
dia, which followed the India
National Congress demand for
independence, in August, 1942,
has seriously crippled the war
effort. Small units of the In-
dian Army have covered them-
selves with glory ,in the liber-
ation of Africa, Sicily and in
Italy. Equally brave men are
today fighting in Burma. But
the tragic situation is, that due
to the political crisis India’s

tremendous manpower remains
immobilized.

The much heralded two mil-
lion strong British Indian army
has been unable to dislodge
about 100,000 Japanese from
Burma, duing the
years. Where is the rest of
the Indian Army? According
to, a statement attributed to
Field Marshal Sir John Dill,
the Indian Army imstead of
fighting the enemy, is at pres-
ent “spread out through India,
largely to prevent internal
revolt.” (Amerasia, New York,
April 28, 1944.)

William Phillips, the person-
al envoy of “President Roose-
velt to India, after his return
from that country in 1943, in

his report to the President,
stated; “The present Indian
Army is purely mercenary.

General Stilwell has expressed
his concern over the situation
and in particular in regard to
the poor morale of the Indian
officers. The attitude of the
general public toward the war
is even worse. Assuming’
that India is known to be an
important base for our future
operations against Burma and
Japan, it would seem to be of
the highest importance that we
should have around us a syim-
pathetic India rather than an
indifferent and possibly a hos-
tile India.” (As quoted by Drew

last two _

Pearson in “Washington Post.”
July 25, 1944.)

The Indo-British political
deadlock, aids no one but the
enemy. It is retarding victory.
As both India and Britain are
anti-fascist and fighting against
the same common fascist en-
emy, this internal strife is un-
justifiable and indefensible. Im
a letter to President Roosevelt,
Gen. Chiang Kai-shek showed
his concern and counselled, “I
hope the U.S. advises Britain
and India to seek a reasonable,
satisfactory solution, for the
welfare of mankind and the
good name of the United Na-
tions, Our war aims and com-
mon interests forbid me to re-
main silent.” (As quoted by
Drew Pearson, New York Daily
Mirror, August 30, 1944.

HE armed forces of the Unit-
ed Nations in the Pacific
will soon enter the colonial
lands now occupied by Japan.
Outside of the Philippines and
China, the United Nations have
done nothing whatsoever to

mobilize the broad masses of ,

the native people against Ja-
pan. Unlike in Europe, the Al-
lies have no political strategy,
which would enable them to
enlist their support. They have
failed to formulate a positive
policy of liberation for these
countries.

Even the Cairo declaration,
aside from declarine that Ja-

pan shall be stripped of all

conquered territories, remained
silent on their future status.
The restoration of Huropean
tule in the Asiatie colonies,
would not: be quite the same
thing as the liberation of Nazi
enslaved. countries in Eure 4-
With the present colonial pe
of the United Nations, our
armies would enter lands which
would largely be hostile to the
imposition of the old colonial
regimes. There would be no
strong mass underground for-
ces to facilitate the task of
our armies.

After his close observation of
colonial Asia, during his good-
will tour in 1942 the late My’.
Wendell L. Willkie, in his book
“One World,” wrote: “Especial—
iy here in Asia, the common
people feel that we have asked
them to join us for no better
reason than that Japanese rule
would be even worse than the
Western imperialism. This is a
continent where the record of
Western democracies has been
long and mixed, but where
people, and remember there are
billions of them, are determin-—
ed no longer to live under
foreign control. They all
want the United Nations to win
the war.

“They all doubt, in, varying
degree, the readiness of the
leading democracies of the
world to stand up and be count-
ed for freedom for others after
the war is over. This doubt
kills their enthusiastic partici-
pation on our side.” (Wendel!
L. Willkie in “One World)—
p. 154.

These are the major issues

upon which victory hinges in -

—Continued on Page 14

 rabeeddiaciinrrttrs (are ae