Page [2==P A: Features,

December 30

2

By JOHN WEIR

Dave LEWIS, national secretary of the CCF, has denied that he told the CCE

national convention in Montreal two week

to Mr. Winch and Mr.

the present time I am con-
cerned with winning an elec-
tion.’ ”

This, he says, was the inter-
pretation of his attitude by his
~ Opponents (the B.C. “leftist”
CCHers led by Winch) and not
his own words.

Be that as it may, the GCF
convention decisions — the re-
ports, resolutions and 19-point
federal election platform —bear
out the main assertion that
the CCF strategy and tactics
jazre turned to only one end,
that of gathering votes by
hook or crook, rather than of

_ concern for directing the forces
of the “left,” the labor and
farm movements, to influence
the course of national policy.

To this end, the reformist
“socialist” program of the Re-
gina Manifesto was “modified”
(over thé protests of the “rey-
olutionary” group from B.C).
To this end also, ordinary
capitalist reform planks in the
election program ‘were spiced
on the other hand, with a pro-
viso that “a Co-operative Com

monwealth...alone can achieye” —

them, although a good many of
them, such as Farmily Allow-
ances, are already on the
Statute books. And to this end,
every CCF speech in the past
two weeks has begun with the
magic words: “We are on the
“eve of power .. .”

Se

“JE. course, the “normal” func-
tion of all parliamentary
parties is to elect candidates
to public office and strive to
become the government. There
are only two troubles with that
maxim. First, we are not living:
in “normal” times. And second,
a party which aspires to repre-
Sent the interests of the worl
ing class, a “socialist” party if
you please, cannot be just “an-
other” parliamentary party.
The Social-Democratic “par-
liamentary cretins,” as Lenin
ealled them, failed the working
class. precisely because they
made parliamentary careerism
the be-all and end-all of their
activities, without-preparing the
working class or proving cap-
able of leading it in the many-
sided activities and struggles
demanded of it when the “peace-
ful” era of capitalist -develop-
ment had ended.

The world has paid for the
fact that Social-Democracy had‘
the main’ deadership of the
working class in all leading
countries outside of Russia. We
have paid for it in fascism and
in war. As a result of these ex--

periences, not only have there

grown up and strengthened the
Marxist, Communist parties in
every land, but the bulk of the
Socialist parties have changed
their policies. :

The CCF is one of the excep-
tions.

As the CCF convention was

sitting in Montreal, Parlia-
rment was in special session at
Ottawa to deal with the most
dangerous political crisis that

Canada has faced since Confed- -

‘eration. Here was the test of
CGF policy. ;

What were the alternatives
facing the country in this crisis ?
if the Tory conspiracy carried
the day, there would be a pro-
fascist reactionary coalition
Zevernment of the “right” es-
tablished, either at once or after
a general election on the false
conscription issue. The hopes of
reform, of the very things the
CCF brain-trusters were writ-
ing into their election platform,
would have been smashed for
years to come. Only the isola-
tion and defeat of the Tories
would make possible the for-
ward march of progress-in Can-
ada.

The: CCF leaders recognized
this. Both Coldwell and Lewis
said so in public addresses.
But their immediate concern
for gathering yotes which they
thought Mackenzie King might
be shedding in the erisis over-
came the greater consideration
for the future (yes, their own
future, too!) of Ganada. And

s ago that “he did not take second place
Cameron in advocating ultimate complete socialism, but that ‘at

interests of people for what is
fondly imagined as a’ vote-
eatchinge performance.

[- IS on this background that
the resolutions and the 19-
‘point election platform adopted
by the CCF national convention
must be judged. The Tories de-
clare that the government got
not a vote of confidence but a
“suspended sentence.” That
means that new plots are in
the making and that while ad-
mitting temporary . defeat the
Tories are preparing to do the
job in the next federal election.
The basie issues in that elec-
tion, the relations of forces in
the country, will be roughly
the same as they were in the
reinforcements crisis.

The CCF convention served
notice that the CCF policy will
be the same as it: was during
the erisis, a policy of “compet-
ing’’ with the Tories for the
anti-Liberal vote—in practice,
helping the Tories to elect the
next government.

nothing” propaganda of the
past had done considerable
harm to popular appeal — the
election platform was
down.” Most of the practical
planks were already presented
previously in much clearer

“toned

terms in the LPP election plat- —

form and in resolutions of the
labor congresses — and many
“coincide with legislation al-
ready adopted or proposed by
the Liberal federal zovern-

ment.

It is on this question that the
sharpest debates took place at
the convention. The B.C. wing
of the party insisted on pre-
senting the “full socialist” pro-
gram in the elections. David
Lewis led the fight for the
“moderate” platform with the
admonition that “we must think
‘im responsible terms as if we

. Were in power.”

Lewis easily carried the day.
The election manifesto declared
that after its first term of of-
fice the CCF will “ask for a
new mandate for a further ad-
vance toward the Cooperative
Commonwealth.”

eS
gn the other hand, the con-

vention had the job of plac-
ing its reform proposals in such

\

“Conbonted by Greatest Opportunity to
Advance Cause of Progress, the CCF
Adopts Line of Disaster

we won’t even mention the
first -of-all consideration of
backing our troops and achiey-
ing victory.

The CCF performance in
this crisis was a most
shameful spectacle. With one
breath they called for “to-
tal “conscription,” defended
the NRMA from “coercion”
and provided the anti-con-
Scriptionist rioters with their
“conscription of wealth” slo-
gans. Having recognized the
Tory threat, they proceeded
to join with the Tories in
attacking the government.

When the yote finally came
in the House, the CCF voted
with the government despite
the “total conscription” resolu-
tion of the convention and Cold-
well’s previous declaration that
he would vote against the gov-
ernment. No doubt the fact that
the Tories did not Swing the
country, and particularly the
resolutions of support to King:
and McNaughton from trade
union leaders and bodies, in-
fluenced that decision. And
then Mr. Kine took away the
last. excuse which would have
lined the CCF with the Tories

and anti-war Quebeckers — he
accepted the innocuous CCE
amendment.

It is fortunate that this Tory
plot was defeated. If it had suc-
ceeded, the GCF would have as
surely been responsible for
what followed as Huropean So-

--cial-Democracy was for Hitler

and the war. Yet this policy
of the CCF is quite consistent,
it is the basie opportunist pol-
icy. of sacrificing the lasting

PESPITE all talk of being:

“on the eye of power,” the
CCF is no such thing and David
Lewis and the rest of the CCF
leaders know it.

The strategy of the CCF is
based on the idea that the two-
party system will be restored
after the war with themselves

as the second party. The CCF”

hopes to have a large enough
group after the next election to
force a  Liberal-Conservative

wedding.

That'this would give Canada
a rightist government for the
next four or five crucial years
is of no concern—or worse, to
be welcomed! — to the CCF,
for in their “parliamentary cre-
tinism” they foresee not the
smashing of the labor move-
ment and of the CCF itself as

the result, but the mirage of a

CCF victory in 1949!
In the meantime,
people suffer!”

(pees task set before the CCF

convention by its leaders
was two-fold. First, it was to
present an election platform
which would best compete with
other reform parties for the
popular vote. - And second, it
was to be presented in such a
Way as to divide the reform
ranks, to make
for a coalition of progressive
forces to be formed which could
carry into life the very reforms
contained in the CCF platform
itself,

In order to cut into the gen-
eral reform vote—and recog-
nizing that the “socialism or

“let the

*

it impossible .-

a way as to prevent a demo-
cratic united front in the coun-
try. This was done not only by
general phraseology about a
“new society” and repetition of
the assertion that “only a CCF
government” can achieve these
things, but also by the dema-
gogie “socialization” clause.

This clause was changed to
permit “private business” to
continue where “it shows no
signs of becoming a monopoly
- - - and fulfills its obligations
to the community” but by pro-
claiming the policy of “either
public or cooperative owner
ship of key industries which
are monopolistic in operation”’
it is calculated te split the re-
form ranks along the “social-
ist” and “anti-socialist?? lines.

As a matter of fact, public
ownership (which, by the way,
is not “socialization” at all)
has been carried out in the past
and will be in the future by
frankly capitalist governments.
At the present time, a number
of enterprises (B.C. Electric,
Nova Scotia coal mines, etc.)
are in the condition where na-
tionalization is necessary. Na-
tionalization in particular in-
stances, therefore, is not a di-
visive issue in the general re-
form ranks. But blanket “so-

cialization” even when sugared

with the -“soft” phraseology
adopted by the CCE convention,
in Canada and at this particu-
lar period, is divisive.

That’s what the CCF meant
it to be.

x

} ctive a3 @ Votes a a i

Ec IS from this backgroun |

‘and Government to guide Can:

E have called this: the “4 4

point” in-the GCE elect
platform demagosy. That it”
nothing: else is best illustra
by the experiences of the oO
CCE provincial governme
that of Saskatchewan. |

The CCF campaigned in §))
katchewan with this “socig:
zation Of monopolies” progra.
With Premier T. C. Douglas
the CCF convention was ae
dressed by the provincial tre: .
urer of Saskatchewan, CG: : |
Fines. Mr. Fines could point —
many good reforms introduc
by the government, reforms HM
the same general nature as @
ist In other progressive pre
inces. But he warned the Gt
convention that their task
not only that of passing go)
legislation but also of creati
a “feeling of confidence in 4
CCF” and complained that
Was “more difficult” to ado}
the CCF program to Saskatch —
wan than elsewhere . : :

And soon after the conve}
tion closed, the Saskatchewa
government declared that ~
would not proceed with the “a
cialization” of the breweries i
the province because . . . the’
pay large taxes into the trea;
ury and, anyhow, the govern q
ment hasn’t got the meney wil
which to buy out the prese}
owners! : i

So much for ‘socializatior
in CCF practice; its place q
the election platform is shexc
demagogy for divisive pui
poses. Sg Ses

©:

that the resolutions of th
CCF national convention fa
into a pattern. The genuine ri
form planks, the vague bu
generally _ progressive state
ments of policy, on the on
hand, to appeal to the elector
ate and particularly to labe
for support. On the other hanc }
the divisive “socialization” de ©
magogy, the shameful competi
tion with the Tories in attack
ing the war government, th
studied evasion of clear-cu
policy towards the Soviet Unio ©
and postwar world policy, th |
emphatie denunciation of labo }
unity and of democratie coali:}
tion policies ... . :

The CCE was faced witl
tremendous opportunities at th {
convention. It could have be 4
come the rallying point of thi i
labor-farmer-socialist forces iG
support of the practical win :
the-war policies in the rein =
forcements crisis and for thé —
postwar reconstruction of Can
ada. This policy. would have 5
made it possible for the CCH
labor-farmer forces to win the :
maximum number of seats Mm ~
the next election, would have |
sealed the doom of the Tory re-
actionaries, would have given |
the left-wing. forces a dominant |
position in the next Parliament

ada’s steps in the postwar.
The CCF failed miserably— ~
and it failed with its eyes open
e' ;

WYHAT is the only role which
the CCF ean playin this
erucial period as a result of its |
convention decisions? It can |
only continue to impede na-—
tional unity for the.war effort |
and thus lend help and comfort
to the forces of reaction im

Canada and abroad. :

fc