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The balance of terror —

By FRED WEIR

During the first years of the Cold War, when America enjoyed a total monopoly of nuclear power, it was con- sidered by U.S. leaders that 20 to 50 atomic devices would suffice to maintain strategic dominance over the Soviet Union, and keep tue Russians from getting ‘‘out of line’’. :

Later, in the 50s, it was decided that at least 100 such weapons would be required, along with more sophisti- cated delivery systems. Under MacNamara, in the 60s, the Department of Defence calculated that 400 ‘‘equiva- lent megatons’’ (the explosive force of 400 one-megaton bombs) would be adequate to directly kill 30% of the population, and destroy 70% of the industry of the USSR.

Today in 1982, although exact figures are not known, the USA disposes a strategic arsenal of approximately

10,000 warheads, the smallest of which is 25 times as ~

powerful as the blast over Hiroshima. These warheads are deployed on 1,054 intercontinental missiles (ICBMs) crouched in silos throughout the American mid-west; 48 ballistic missile submarines, the newest of which is the Trident which carries 24 submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs), each missile with 10 or more independently targeted warheads; and the Strategic Air Command (SAC), with 380 bombers based around the world capa- ble of striking anywhere in the Soviet Union.

This is the strategic ‘‘Triad’’ of the United States: ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. Each “‘leg’’ of the Triad is designed to operate independently, to function as if the U.S. had no other forces at its command.

In addition, the U.S. maintains nearly 22,000 ‘“‘tacti- cal’’ warheads in Europe, at bases around the world, and with aircraft carriers on every ocean. A very large per- centage of these ‘“‘tactical’’ weapons are able to reach targets deep in the USSR.

The Soviet Union has a strategic arsenal which todays totals somewhat more than 4,000 warheads. These are mostly on ICBMs buried deep in the USSR, but also on some 50 ballistic missile submarines and to a far lesser extent with about 100 ageing Tu-95 ‘“‘Bear’’ inter- continental bombers. The Soviet Union also disposes an unknown number of tactical nuclear warheads (the Center for Defence Information in Washington estimates around 12,000) based entirely on Soviet soil. No Soviet tactical nuclear weapon has the capability to reach the United States.

The degree of overkill embodied in these aresenals is astonishing. Just one U.S. Poseidon ballistic missile submarine would be able to incinerate the 150 largest towns and cities of Eastern Europe, with warheads to spare. Only seven Poseidon submarines — a small frac- tion of the fleet — carry enough independently-targeted warheads, with sufficient equivalent-megatonnage, to devastate every major population center in the USSR, eastern Europe, the People’s Republic of Mongolia, Viet- nam, North Korea and Cuba.

This is the reality that underlaid the SALT negotia- tions which began in 1969. If both sides possessed the raw might to utterly destroy -a nuclear attacker, then, palpably, an inescapable stalemate existed. This was mutual assured destruction (MAD). : :

Powerful forces within the American governmental and military establishments opposed the MAD concept and the arms control negotiations which seemed the only sane response to a nuclear statemate. As the Vietnam war ended, and American priorities began to shift, these forces launched a great offensive, the rhetoric of which has become familiar to all of us.

‘While the era of U.S. superiority is long past, parity — not U.S. inferiority — has replaced it, and the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in strategic nuclear power.”

— U.S. Dept. of Defence Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982

First, they claimed, technology has made a pre- emptive nuclear first-strike a distinct possibility. One side — always the Russians in these scenarios — could launch its missiles, not at cities, but at the ICBM silos and other military facilities oftheir adversary. Increasing accuracy of missile guidance systems make this think- able, they said. A successful first strike against Ameri- can ICBMs would leave the country defenceless. Thus, they argued, the United States must greatly expand its strategic arsenal, and develop a first strike capability in

Second, they argued, nuclear war would not necessar- ily result in mutual assured destruction. If*‘limited”’ toa military, industrial and command (i.e. governmental) targets — the so-called ‘‘counterforce’’ strategy — a distinct winner could emerge from a nuclear conflict, they claimed.

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—MARCH 5, 1982—Page 10

FEATURE

The proponents of these arguments in the U.S. have almost totally won out. The ‘‘voices in the wilderness’ of five years ago are today top-flight members of the Reagan administration. Some of these are Caspar Wein- berger, Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, Daniel O. Graham, and Jeane Kirkpatrick. These people today control virtually every military policy-making agency in Washington. Reagan appointees even dominate the offi- cial Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which, ina bizarre twist, has been publicly advocating a stepped-up pace of rearmament. _ The counterforce strategy was officially adopted by the Carter administration late in 1980. Presidential Direc- tive 59 enshrined the winnable nuclear war as U.S. government policy. To build a first-strike capability, thousands of new warheads will be added to the U.S. strategic arsenal in coming years. Specifically:

e Cruise Missiles. Probably the most dangerous weapons system under development today. Designed for terrain-following tactics to avoid radar detection, and can fly up to 3,000 miles (4,828 km) to deliver a 1,000 Ib. (490 kg) thermonuclear warhead within 100 feet (30.5 metres) of the target. Cruise missiles will be produced in the thousands, and deployed in several varieties: the air-launched version (ALCM) intended to be packed onto wide-bodied jumbo jets which constantly patrol the airspace around the Soviet Union; the sea-launched ver- sion (SLCM) to be mounted on ships and submarines; the ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) in large quantities for US. bases overseas — 464 to Europe next year.

“Public opinion is being accustomed to the idea that war is possible... The idea is being drummed in that if there is war, it will be the fault of the Arabs and Russians. The masses are being conditioned to expect war, a war that is in fact being planned to save the economic system.’’

— French Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, quoted by M. Myerson in Stopping World War IIT’

e The B-1 bomber. Some 100 of these advanced, supersonic intercontinental bombers will shortly be ac- quired for the Strategic Air Command as an “‘interim”’ replacement for its older B-52s. The B-1 itself is destined to be replaced “‘as soon as possible’ by the mysterious ‘Stealth’? bomber, the ultimate first-strike weapon, we are told, utterly impervious to radar detection.

e The M-X, Pershing II, and Trident. These new missiles are now, or soon will be, replacing previous U.S. ICBM, tactical delivery, and SLBM systems re- spectively. These weapons have vastly improved, ultra-sophisticated electronic guidance systems take the warheads to their targets with what the generals call “*house address accuracy’’.

This is the alternative for which the U.S. leadership has abandoned the SALT process, and is currently sabotaging any progress toward new strategic arms limitations talks. The theory of winnable nuclear war, and the development of a first-strike technology are the Pentagon’s answers to the nuclear stalemate, the means to escape the ‘‘trap”’ of strategic partity with the USSR.

_ US and USSR Deliverable | Warheads : 5000 +

4688 4000 + 3000 + 2647 2154 1000 ;- 909 se S 430 = 21s Ole = Silele ls | @ |g Son mo eek tn tg US: 8900 USSR: 3856 *Total for bombers includes both warheads delivered by air-to-surface missiles deployed on bombers and gravity bombs. Assumes an average of six warheads and/or bombs. delivered by FB-111s. four by B-52s and two by Soviet aircraft. Source: Adapted from Military Balance. 1977-78. US | Department of Defense. Annual Defense Department | Report. FY 1978. and John M. Collins, American and | Soviet Military Strength: Contemporary Trends Com- pared. 1970-1976. published in Congressiona’ Record. August 5. 1977. pp S 14064-104.

The drive, as in the past, is to reassert complet strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. If the Pent# gon is successful in developing a first-strike capability ~ and the U.S. leads in this technology by a wide margin— the result will be the darkest and most dangerous day’ our earth has ever known. The material cost of this neW

_arms drive, if it is not averted, may impoverish us all. The human cost may be absolute. | Main References:

Aldridge, Robert: The Counterforce Syndrome Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. 1978

Barnet, Richard: The Economy of Death Atheneum Books, New York, 1969

Dornan, Dr. James, et al: The U.S. War Machine iy Crown Publishers, New York, 1978 | Institute for strategic studies: The Military Balance 1979-1980 ~ ISS, London, 1980 ‘= Joyce, James Avery: The War Machine . Quartet Books, London, 1980 i

Myerson, Michael et al: Stopping World War III U.S. Peace Council, New York, 1981

Quanbeck, Alton: Strategic Forces

The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 1973

Fred Weir, author of the 1980 pamphlet, The Arms Menace, is a history graduate who has travelled wide! | in eastern and western Europe and the Middle East.

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The ground launched Cruise missile, probably the most dangerous weapons system under development today. Design®? to avoid radar detection it can fly up to 3,000 miles to deliver a 1,000 Ib thermonuclear warhead within 100 feet of its target

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