Must We Appease Franco?

By ANDREI GROMYKO Eollowing is an abridged text of the Soviet delegate’s statement to the United Nations” Security Council on April 25 in which he criticized the Angle-American “go slow” policy on Fascist Spain and proposed an immedi- ate break in diplomatic relations with Franco.

iS ONE tries to sum up the speeches that Have been delivered in the Security Council during the discussion

of the communique of the Polish government (asking for boycott of Franco) one may reach the following conclu-

sions: The basic motive of those members of the council who

objected to the Polish proposal came out most clearly in the remarks of Sir Alexander Cado- gan, the British delegate.

“The theme of the remarks of Sir Alexander amounted to the statement that neither the Po- lish delegate, who has drawn the attention of the council to the~ situation in Spain, nor the members of the council who support the Polish proposal have brought forward the pre- cise data able to convince the council that the fascist regime in Spain really represents a danger to international peace.

Thus, the whole affair may be resumed in the formula of “insufficient evidence.”

Past Mistakes

IN my very first speech, If

expressed the hope that his- toric lessons of the past could be kept in mind during the dis- cussion of this question by the council and that the council would not repeat the mistake made in the past.

The formula “insufficient evi- dence,” has, as.is known, its history. This formula has been applied very readily and very frequently in the past by sup- porters and admirers of the no- torious pclicy of non-interven- tion.

Every one knows, for instance, that Japan seized Manchuria between September, 1931, and January, 1932. The fact of ag- gression was present. China ap- pealed to the council of the iheague of Nations at that time with the proposal that the ques- tion should be investigated and that sanctions should be applied under Article°1i6 of the Coven- ant of the League of Nations, itself in a difficult position.

Qn the one hand, Japanese ageression was clearly appar- ent, and no supplementary evi- dence was needed to establish it; on the other hand, the lead- ing members of the council did not wish to apply any measures to bridle this act of aggression.

The issue finally found had been suggested by Japan her-

Self, who expressed the idea of

forming a commission of in- quiry. Non-Intervention

members of the council

of the League of WNations seized upon this way out as n it were a life belt, though there was nothing really to inquire about. Although the fact of ag- gression was perfectly evident it was decided that a commis- Sion of inquiry should be set ‘up to verify whether ageression against China had taken place.

As is known, in 1936, soon after the beginning of the Italo- German armed intervention in Spain, a Committee of Non-In- tervention was formed in TLon- don under the presidency of Lord Plymouth.

At that time, while the Ger- man and Italian interyentionists Were crushing the Spanish re- public, the supporters of the non-intervention meeting in Ion- don, in fact, encouraged by their eonduct the aggressive acts of German and italian fascism in Spain.

To all the data which was submitted to the Plymouth com- mittee concerning the sending of troops, arms and supplies by Hitler and Mussolini into Spain for the crushing of the popular anti-fascist movement there, the supporters and perpetrators of the policy of non-intervention replied: “Insufficient evidence.

if one takes the speeches, for

instance, of pre-war British Statesmen who supported the policy of non-intervention and replaces the names of Hitler and Mussolini with that of Hranco, one observes that the sense and content of these speeches does not differ in any way from the sense and con- tent of the speeches of some of the members of the Security Council.

World Skeptical

HE demand for supplemen- tary evidence against the fas- cist regime of Franco, and the accompanying demand for the

proposal of a formation of a commission will represent only unhappy

a repetition of the

TWO OF A KIND

- BEVIN

Chamberlain (1937) “. ... there are no German or Italian troops in Spain.” Be- vin, (1946) “. . .~[ am not convinced Franco Spain is a Menace to peace.”

PACIFIC TRIBUNE — PAGE 11

INV CUR TUTE

““‘Non-Intervention”’

Le aa cy

eins

bankrupt methods of the past, which have been applied in con- nection with the question men- tioned and methods of war against aggression.

It is no accident that the proposal for the formation of a commission in connection with the discussion of the question which now faces us was met by skepticism on the part of world public opinion.

Nor is it accidental that the Franco regime, only a few days ago, came forward with the Same idea, remembering appar: ently the experience of Japan in 1931—came forward with the proposal as I have already said, “that a commission should be set up to examine the ques- tions now. before us.”

Dr. Van Kileffens (the Dutch delegate) attempted to show

that such measures as the rup-

ture of diplomatic relations might strengthen the Hranco regime instead of weakening it. Dr. Van Kleffens evidently de- Sires to ward off the possibil- ity of such a “frightful error’ —on the part of the supporters of the proposal for the rupture of diplomatic relations with Franco, but I must say that I have never heard of a fascist regime being strengthened by the breaking off of diplomatic relations with that regime by other states.

if those members of the Se- curity Council who make such statements were consistent, they would have to propose a revision of the charter of the United Nations, in which, as is well known, the breaking off of diplomatic relations is pro- vided for by Article 41 and is contained aiso in Chapter VII, and iS considered 2s one of the actions that may be taken re- garding threats to peace, the violation of peace and acts of aggression.

The United Nations which ad- opted and ratified the charter

did not have any doubt that the breaking off of diplomatic relations was to be considered as a measure of punishment and pressure to be applied toward those states which do not act in conformity with the aims and

principles of the United WNa-

tions.

I wish to ‘draw the attention of the members of the Security Council in this connection to ene fact which refers to a speech of Sir Alexander Cado- gan in which he opposed the proposal for the rupture of dip- lomatie relations with Franco. According to the New York Times, this statement was very well received in Madrid.

I have seen nothing in the American press. to the effect that Madrid was satisfied, for example, with the statement of the Polish delegate.

Mr. Stettinius (U.S. delegate), in his speech said that he was attempting to outline the gen- eral aims of the United States government regarding the ques- tion of relations with the Fran- €o regime, and he pointed out that one of these aims was to

avoid a repetition of civil war -

that had tken place in Spain.

it a5. known that civil wars in some countries have not al- ways had bad results. For ex- ample, the historical place and Significance of the Civil War in the United States is well known.

I wish here to to pointing out wrongness and the illogicality of the proposal of inaction in regard to the Franco regime, as I believe that such inaction on the part of the members of the United Nations, and in par- ticular on the part of the Se curity Couneil; one of its chief organs, would increase the threat to peace and security which is at present presented

limit myself simply the

‘by the existing Spanish fascist

regime. 5 ' Must we really wait until the cannons and the automatic arms

nize the presence of a danger to peace?

I think that experience has shown that in situations such as this when that line is fol- lowed, it is already too late to maintain peace. In such cases the result is that we are bound te shed blood in order to stop the ggeressor.

Fear Of War ?

T IS maintained that the fear of civil war in Spain would justify inaction with regard tc the fascist regime planted there by Hitler and Mussolini, which is a source of serious threat to the peaceful life of the peoples. it is the affair of the Spanish people to decide in what way it wishes to free itself from the hated fascist regime. :

it is the task of the United Nations to: remove this source ef danger to international se- curity which the existence of the fascist regime in Spain con- stitutes, and it is the task of the United Nations at the same time to help the Spanish peo- ple and the Spanish democratic forces to take back to them- selves the democratic freedoms that have been taken away from them.

The declaration of the repre- sentative of Poland and also the discussion which has taken place in the Security Council on this question leave no doubt that the fascist regime of Hran- co, as it exists at present in Spain, is, indeed, a serious dan- ger for international peace and security.

In view of this fact, it is-not necessary to set up any kind of commission or committee to study this question. In the pres- ence of an abundance of facts and evidence which confirm the accusations against the fas- cist regime made by the Polish delegate, the formation of a committee could only have a negative effect both on world public opinion and upon the democratic forces of Spain her=-

begin to Speake before we recog-self.

EREIDAY, MAY 17, 1946